Chapter Ten

From Tullahoma to Chickamauga

By January 8, the army had reached the end of their forty-eight mile march, arriving in camp at Tullahoma and Shelbyville. Irving Buck’s brother, Alvin, who was looking for an adjutant’s job in the army, wrote home saying that “the great battle of the 31^st Dec…cured [Irving] of any love he ever entertained for fighting”. Reminiscing upon these events, Irving wrote, “The more I look back upon the battle and think of the showers of death passed through, the more I wonder at my escape, and feel my inability to return my gratitude and thanks to a kind Providence for thus bringing me through unhurt and attribute it in part to the prayers that I know are daily sent up in my behalf at home.” Referring to discontent among the generals and soldiers of Bragg’s leadership, Buck believed that Beauregard should supersede him. “I esteem Gen. Bragg as a brave and gallant soldier, but no strategist. As a subordinate he will do very well, but cannot be trusted alone, the past six months have fully demonstrated this.” (1)

In response to widespread criticism, Bragg sent a circular to all his generals on January 11, stating that Kirby Smith had traveled to Richmond to replace him. Bragg claimed that the criticism from the press was a result of the retreat from Murfreesboro—a move which all of his subordinates had supported. Asking them to be candid in their responses, Bragg wrote that if “I find that I have lost the good opinion of my generals” he would “retire without regret.” As Cleburne was trying to figure out how to respond to this curious letter, Hardee walked into his tent, wanting to consult with him about his own copy of the circular. In reply to Bragg’s letter, Cleburne promptly responded that contrary to rumors stating otherwise, the agreement to fall back from Murfreesboro had been mutual among the generals, himself included, given the unfortunate circumstances. After consulting with his brigadiers, Cleburne wrote in regard “of your great capacity for organization” but also stated, “with regret” that “you do not possess the confidence of the Army, in other respects, in that degree necessary to secure success”. The vote in Hardee’s Corps was unanimous; “the fighting bishop”, Polk, who never hid his animosity towards Bragg, was in Richmond asking for his removal. The only generals which responded in favor of Bragg was Cheatham and Withers. Cheatham was highly criticized for his support by the other generals, who knew that he was, in reality, opposed to Bragg but too afraid to speak out. Referring to Cheatham as the “fox”, Cleburne related to his brigadiers an Irish fable:

The report has been circulated among the beasts of the forest that the lion had bad breath, whereupon, as king, the lion summoned all to appear, and admitted them to his presence one by one. As each would answer upon smelling his breath that it was bad, the lion would devour him, When at length the fox was brought in, he replied to the question that he had a bad cold, and escaped. (2)

In addition to formidable earthworks around Tullahoma, the division constructed a crude wooden structure for their commander’s headquarters. Here, Cleburne wrote his lengthy report of the battle, mentioning not only the various movements of his brigades, but also individual acts of bravery which he had witnessed among his men. Irving Buck and a few other staff officers stayed at headquarters while “the remainder of our staff are camped in the woods about one-forth of a mile”. As occasional snowball fights broke out, Buck wrote, “I am perfectly contented to stay quietly in the house—the snow is thick on the ground, but what do we care so long as we keep such roaring fires as we do”. In addition, Cleburne hired a German cook for $40 a month to prepare the food at headquarters which included beef, mutton, turkey, fish, eggs, coffee, tee, rolls, and strawberries. (3)

The prevailing good humor notwithstanding, Cleburne had much on his mind—the enemy was near and would likely attack come spring. The division participated in drills throughout the winter and into the spring every day except Sunday and when the weather was bad. Having obtained a copy of the British “Regulations for Conducting Musketry Instruction in the Army”, Cleburne instructed Benham to devise a similar manual for the troops. The sharpshooting units under his command had played vital parts in the past battles and these had only been equipped with standard infantry percussion muskets. Therefore, one day during rifle practice, he announced that the five best shots in his division would receive their own Whitworth sniper rifle equipped with telescopic sights. Ordered direct from England, they had cost the Confederacy $1,000 a piece. The five-man Whitworth squad became the first in the Army of Tennessee.

While in camp, Hardee informed Cleburne that, as Congress had adopted a national flag, regimental battle flags were to be changed in accordance. Cleburne, knowing that his men were loyal to the flags which they had carried since Shiloh, refused this order and requested that his division be an exception. With Hardee’s approval, the request was granted.

Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle of the British Army on his three month tour across the South visited Wartrace. Here, he observed Cleburne’s Division, whom he described as

healthy, and well clothed, though without any attempt at uniformity in color or cut, but nearly all were dressed either in grey or brown coats and felt hats. I was told that even if a regiment was clothed in proper uniform by the government, it would become parti-colored again in a week, as the soldiers preferred wearing the coarse homespun jackets and trousers made by their mothers and sisters at home.

Fremantle believed that this was a wise decision by their general, who only insisted that their arms and accoutrements were kept in the right order. Cleburne inquired after his old regiment, the 41st

He told me that he ascribed his advancement mainly to the useful lessons which he had learnt in the ranks of the British army, and he pointed with a laugh to his general's white facings, which he said his 41st experience enabled him to keep cleaner than any other Confederate general.

Fremantle said that Cleburne was 35 but looked older as his hair was graying. “ Generals Bragg and Hardee both spoke to me of him in terms of the highest praise, and said that he had risen entirely by his own personal merit”. (4)

In response to a Federal sortie out of Murfreesboro, Bragg sent Hardee’s Corps north to occupy the gaps or good roads which crossed the “range of hills dividing the headwaters of Duck river from the headwaters of Stone’s River”. Cleburne’s Division was stationed in the town of Wartrace with Liddell’s Brigade picketing both Bell Buckle and Liberty Gaps. Irving Buck wrote on April 26 that “the change is delightful, we are in the midst of field, forest, and rivers, all of which we enjoy to their full extent, The General, our Surgeon and myself are in a very comfortable house”. To the right of Liddell’s positions were Dismal Hallow and Hoover’s Gaps, held by Wheeler’s Cavalry. Bragg was hoping that Rosecrans would become impatient, attacking either Cleburne’s or Wheeler’s positions, thus becoming flanked by Polk’s Corps which would be brought up from reserve, then fortified in Shelbyville. (5)

Meanwhile, Johnston was ordered to Mississippi to oppose Grant. Additional troops were taken from Bragg’s already outnumbered army for this operation and in the reorganization which followed, Bushrod Johnson’s brigade was taken from Cleburne’s Division to form a new division for the newly-appointed A.P. Stewart. In return, Cleburne was given a Texas brigade commanded by Thomas J. Churchill. One of the captains of this command recalled, “We could never get out of hearing of some fool making fun of us about that fight at Ark. Post. There was but one General that would have us—Pat Cleburn said he was not afraid to try us”. (6)

The Federal’s silence was quickly broken when they advanced simultaneously on Liberty and

Hoover’s Gaps on the evening of June 24. The next morning, Cleburne rode out to inspect the situation on what one of his soldiers called the general’s “clumsy old plough horse of an animal”. Finding that the enemy had pushed Liddell’s picket’s out of the narrow gap and that he now held only two wooded hills at the southern exit, Cleburne ordered Woods’ Brigade be brought up for support. Liddell expressed his belief to the general that the enemy was falling back and that the move had been just another sortie; he suggested that he make a cautious advance through the pass. Cleburne agreed. After a brief engagement with the enemy, Liddell was forced to retired to the wooded hills. Cleburne now believed that he faced a division and ordered Liddell to take up defensive positions.

The next day, as Spring rains fell, the enemy’s three brigades advanced out of the pass, keeping up a continuous fire. Cleburne ordered his men on the wooded hills to keep their heads down and not to return fire, as their ammunition was dangerously low. He sent these three regiments to the rear and called for a fresh regiment of Churchill’s Brigade and his Whitworth squad to take up their former positions. The enemy advanced twice that day and each time the advance was halted by Churchill’s skirmishers and the sharpshooters. By night, the enemy had fallen back to their former positions. Cleburne was impressed by his sharpshooters, “which appeared to do good service” as he said. Mounted men especially were their targets that day, which were struck down anywhere from 1,300 to 700 yards. One Federal officer recalled that “the effect of their sharpshooters was terrible”. Another officer was convinced that they were facing “a much larger force than ours”. Although one regiment and his sharpshooters had held back an entire Federal division, a retreat was necessary. While the fight was going on, the enemy’s main force had been able to push through Hoover’s Gap, thus threatening Tullahoma. The retreat commenced at daylight of the 27. Cleburne recalled:

my men were much wearied by the watching and fighting in front of the gaps, for it rained incessantly during most of the time. The men had no changes of clothing, no tents, and could not even light fires to dry themselves. Many had no shoes, and others left their shoes buried in the deep mire of the road.

Confederate casualties numbered about 121 and Federal casualties numbered about 231in the fight at Liberty Gap from the 24 to the 27. Although officially a skirmish, the Federal division commander, Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson noted, “few skirmishes ever equaled it in severity”. (7)

Continuing into the 28, the army withdrew their positions to convene around Tullahoma and its entrenchments. With Rosecrans following closely, Cleburne personally commanded the rearguard of the retreating army which consisted of several cavalry regiments and one of his brigades. On the night of the 30, as the army awaited battle at Tullahoma, Bragg received word that Rosecrans had been able to move in the rear of his position: another retreat was necessary. Still serving as rearguard, Cleburne crossed the Elk River at Bethpage Bridge and placed his men and artillery on a high ridge overlooking the Rosecrans’ advance. Three times Cleburne’s men drove the enemies’ skirmishers back. That night, the bridge was burnt and the rearguard commenced their march. After these long marches, Cleburne remained in the saddle until he rode around to each of his brigade’s camps, attending to their supplies, equipment, and clothing.

Starting on July 3, the army ascended the mountains, heading for Chattanooga. For the first time, the army could relax: the enemy was so far behind them that there was no reason for a rearguard. Following an order given the previous night, Cleburne marched his division onto the road to lead the army for that day’s march. He was surprised when his lead regiment met another command in front of them on the road. Galloping up to the front, he abruptly told its commander, Brigadier general John C. Brown to halt his command to allow his division to pass. Arriving at the head of the column, Cleburne found Hardee and learned that a change had been made in orders since the previous night and that Brown was supposed to lead the advance that day. Without another word, Cleburne immediately rode back to Brown and apologized.

As the army arrived in camp around Chattanooga, Cleburne was temporally in command of Hardee’s Corps while its commander was away. Now in command of 15,000 men, his tasks became increasingly administrative and tedious. Even Buck avoided approaching him with new paperwork. Despite these warnings, the assistant adjutant of Brown’s Division came one evening into his tent with a request for a leave. He found the general on his cot reading a book. After saluting, to which Cleburne made no reply, the captain impatiently dropped his paper between Cleburne’s face and his book. Cleburne brushed the paper away, saying “Do you know, sir, that your command sends more of these communications to these headquarters than any other command in the army?” After picking up his paper, the captain denied the fact, stating that this was the first from his command. Cleburne shot back that he was violating orders by not sending his request by courier. The captain admitted that it was a violation, but that if the general read his letter, he would find the circumstances permissible for his actions, adding that “if I am not a good soldier it is your fault and you are to blame”. Cleburne, rising, asked why that was. The captain replied, “Well, General, I belonged to your old brigade; you trained me, and I received my first baptism of fire by your side at Shiloh.” Cleburne, pacing, said to himself, “Was it not a hard-fought but magnificent and glorious battle? Were there ever such soldiers as fought that day? No country but ours ever produced such. It was a battle gallantly won and as stupidly lost.” Noticing the paper on the floor, Cleburne picked it up and read it. It was a request for a three-day leave so that the captain could go home to see his three year old daughter who was dying. Cleburne immediately sat down at his desk, signed it and handed it to the captain. (8)

Hardee, after a conference with Bragg, was sent to Mississippi with orders to help Johnston face Grant and Sherman. Cleburne was defiantly a candidate for taking permanent command of Hardee’s Corps but so was Cheatham, who was his senor by rank. Without Hardee’s endorsement, Cleburne would have to be approved by Davis and Bragg. Davis hesitated to appoint Cleburne because of his foreign birth and the fact he was not a West Pointer; Bragg, although he often called him an officer “ever alive to success”, remembered that Cleburne had been one of the generals which opposed him several months earlier. If Cheatham had hoped that his support of Bragg would win him points for the job, he was soon disappointed. In the end, it was Daniel Harvey Hill, a West Pointer who had known Bragg in the old army and had served in the Eastern Theater with Johnston and Lee since the outbreak of war, who was appointed.

Hill was surprised to find Bragg so haggard at their first meeting. He realized that this was a different Bragg than he had known some years earlier. The general obviously did not know what he was doing, he even suggested that Hill make a few proposals as to their next move. Hill did not know how to reply to this strange question and left the meeting confused. Assuming command of Hardee’s Corps on July 24, Hill found Cleburne to be a competent commander.

After a month of indecision, Cleburne was ordered to remove his division from their observation posts along the river and retreat with the army down the Lafayette Road into Georgia, thus surrendering Tennessee almost without a fight.

A week after the missed opportunity at McLemore’s Cove, in which Cleburne’s command only skirmished with the enemy, the division remained on the heights of Pigeon Mountain watching Thomas’ Corps closely. Hill unimpressed with Bragg’s handling so far. He wrote:

The want of information at General Bragg's headquarters was in striking contrast with the minute knowledge General Lee always had of every operation in his front, and I was most painfully impressed with the feeling that it was to be a hap-hazard campaign on our part.

Once, on September 14, Thomas ordered a reconnaissance to be sent out to feel the Confederate’s strength. Upon seeing the Texas Brigade, now commanded by James Deshler, posted strongly in the gap with two pieces of artillery, the reconnaissance fell back. Two days later, Thomas sent an entire brigade to oppose the Texans; twice they were repulsed. (9)

On September 17, Rosecrans ordered Thomas’ and McCook’s Corps to march northward to Lee & Gordon’s Mills. Unaware of these movements, Bragg’s plan was to place his entire army on the east side of the Chickamauga River, with his right flank at Reed’s Bridge, some 4 miles northeast of Lee & Gordon’s Mills.

Cleburne received orders from Bragg on the afternoon of the 19, directing him to leave Pigeon Mountain and lead the attack with Hill’s Corps across the Chickamauga near his headquarters at Thedford’s Ford, where they overlapped the Federal’s left. Bragg’s extended plan was to bend Rosecrans’s flank back, driving his army south towards McLemore’s Cove where they, cut off from Chattanooga, would be trapped and destroyed. Rosecrans became aware of this plan and began shifting his forces accordingly.

Galloping ahead of his division, Cleburne arrived at Bragg’s headquarters at 4pm. During the meeting, the sound of artillery could be heard off to the east, Bragg gave him specific instructions, instructing him to join the right flank which Polk commanded. Ridding back to his command, Cleburne found his men preparing to cross the river. The sun was already setting and Cleburne knew there was no time to loose: the artillery off to the east was now joined by the sound of musketry. “Boys” Cleburne yelled , “go through that river, we can’t wait.” Crossing the bone-chilling river while holding their rifles and accouterments high over their heads, Cleburne’s entire division hastily crossed the Chickamauga, falling into line as they arrived on the other side for a two-mile march to the battlefield. (10)

Passing by a bloodied Georgia regiment which had fallen back to the road, the regiment gave a cheer of encouragement to the division. An artillery corporal, noticing the lull in the fight, asked a nearby general, Nathan Bedford Forrest, if the day’s fighting was over. Forrest, pointing towards the road replied, “Do you see that large body of infantry marching this way in columns of fours? That is General Pat Cleburne’s Division; hell will break loose in Georgia in about fifteen minutes.” (11)

Reporting to Polk, Cleburne was directed to form a second line behind Liddell’s position. Liddell’s men were lying prone amid the whizzing bullets which came from an unseen enemy in their front. Liddell urged Cleburne to advance his men at once and attack the enemy because “minute now will be worth an hour tomorrow”. Cleburne was not sure that such a night attack would be a good idea. It was only until Hill confirmed the order that Cleburne gave the order. Deploying his men, he placed Polk with Calvert’s Battery on his right, Wood with Semple’s Battery in the center, and Deshler with Douglas’ Texan Battery, on the left; the entire line extending almost a mile. (12)

At 6pm, the line moved forward, past Liddell’s line and into the darkness. Soon the flash of musketry was detected towards the division’s center. Wood’s Brigade immediately fired a volley in reply. Cleburne wrote: “For a half hour the firing was the heaviest I had ever heard; it was dark, however, and accurate shooting impossible. Each party was aiming at the flashes of the other’s guns, and few of the shot from either side took effect.” Polk’s Brigade moved forward, fired into the enemy in their front causing them to retreat. Wood’s Brigade, however, were unable to dislodge the enemy in their front, which were posted behind log barricades. As they began to give, Cleburne rode ”like a fury” to each of his brigades, dodging shot, shell, canister and Minnie balls, urging them to hold. Benham claimed he had never saw Cleburne like that before, that “horse and rider seemed frenzied alike” Despite his urgings, Wood’s Brigade continued to fall back. Finding the artillery chief, Major Hotchkiss, Cleburne ordered that he take his artillery under the cover of darkness up to the line of the enemy and drive them from their barricade. Hotchkiss obeyed, wheeling his batteries to within 60 yards of the enemy’s position. In unison, the batteries opened fire on the unsuspecting enemy with double canister, driving them from their position. Cleburne yelled for his men to charge. As the Rebel Yell resounded down the line in the darkness, each regiment charged forward, pursuing the enemy into their own camp. In the fight, they captured three artillery pieces and two regimental colors and about 300 prisoners. As Hill witnessed the charge, he was impressed. Of all the battles he had witnessed in the East, he claimed that “I have never seen troops behave more gallantly than did this noble division, and certainly I never saw so little straggling from the field”. Seeing that a further pursuit was impossible, Cleburne gathered his scattered division around the enemy’s old camp for the night. (13)

A Federal soldier recalled the kindness of a squad from Cleburne’s division which went out to aid the injured.

A squad (five, if I remember correctly) were passing to the front about fifty yards from where I had fallen. I called to them. They halted, and asked who I was and what I wanted. I replied that I was a wounded Federal soldier, and wanted to be helped into an easier position, as I was suffering from a broken leg. They came to me promptly and assisted me as gently as if I had been one of their own men or a brother to a large tree where I would be protected from the fire of our own men…The tenderness with which they had lifted me touched me and I said: “Boys, an hour or two ago we were engaged in shooting each other, and now you are treating me with the greatest kindness. I hardly know how to thank you for it in return.” They only replied, “Well, old fellow, we are doing to you only as we should like to be done by. It may come our turn next”, and they passed on to the front picket line for the night. (14)

The next morning dawned early with a heavy frost covering the battlefield. Cleburne arose, ordered that rations be issued to the troops, and sat down for breakfast when Hill rode up. Soon, they were joined by Breckinridge and the three generals discussed the fight from the previous night and speculated if it would be resumed, as no orders had been given. At about 6:30, a courier rode up, announcing that he had orders from General Polk. Hill, who was closest to the courier, reached out his hand to take the dispatch, but the courier pulled it away from his grasp, saying that the orders were for Cleburne and Breckinridge. When Hill demanded to know why he, a corps commander, had been bypassed, the courier replied that it was because he had already been issued his orders the previous night but that no one could find him. While Hill and the courier argued, Cleburne read the order for himself and Breckinridge. It had been written at 5:30 that morning and instructed them to attack as soon as they were in position. Telling Hill what the dispatch said, Cleburne added that he would not order his men to fight until they finished their breakfast. Hill grabbed a piece of paper and scrawled a reply to Polk, mentioning that “General Cleburne reports that the Yankees were felling trees all night, and consequently now occupy a position too strong to be taken by assault.” (15)

Shortly after the courier left with this message, Polk, who had not met the courier en route, arrived wanting to know why Cleburne had not attacked yet. After Cleburne explained his reasons, Polk agreed that there was no real urgency and rode off. Not long after Polk left, Bragg came into camp. He had met the courier en route and was steamed. Bragg demanded to know why Hill had not led the attack at dawn. Hill claimed that this was the first he had heard of a dawn attack, mentioning that Polk had stopped by. Bragg angrily muttered under his breath and ordered the generals to attack as soon as possible, then rode off to find Polk.

Cleburne placed his line to the left of Breckinridge, in the same order as they were the previous night with directions for Lucius Polk’s Brigade to keep in contact with Breckinridge’s line. Although Bragg believed that they, the confederate right wing, would encounter little resistance during the day as he figured that Rosecrans’s line did not extend very far to the north of Lee & Gordon’s Mills, Cleburne began to fear the worse. The sound of axes that morning and a brief reconnaissance of the ground soon convinced him that Rosecrans had shifted his line northward in the night and that they would face a stronger resistance than at any other part of the line. The crash of musketry to his right told him that Breckinridge was engaging the enemy and soon Cleburne’s Division moved forward.

Their opponent was Major General Thomas and his corps of well- entrenched men. Outnumbered 4 to 1, Cleburne’s Division pushed forward, facing a storm of lead. After reaching to within 175 yards of the barricade, the line fell back, taking cover behind a rise of ground. A short time later, the assault was renewed in conjunction with Stewart’s Division, but again it was repulsed. Although he wanted to renew the assault a third time, Cleburne saw that it was useless and ordered his men to pull back. The Texas Brigade, so often criticized by other commands for the Arkansas post affair, was the only brigade in the division that held their position until 2pm. In the fight, they lost almost half their men and their commander, James Deshler, who was nearly cut in half by an artillery shell.

Although their sacrifice seemed to be in vain as they pulled back and regrouped, the Rebel Yell was heard far off to their left signaling a breakthrough. Just as Rosecrans had pulled additional troops from his right to support Thomas, General Longstreet and his carefully planned five brigade deep force attacked the right, bursting through the weakened lines. Unaware of what exactly was occurring, to one of Cleburne’s veterans it sounded like ”ten thousand earthquakes had been turned loose”, the division awaited further orders. (16)

At about 3:30 a staff officer galloped up and breathlessly ordered Cleburne to move with Breckinridge around to the far right to try and outflank Thomas. After a careful survey of the field, Cleburne placed his division in formation and ordered them forward. Before long, they were in sight of the barricade. Cleburne was surprised to see Thomas retreating and sent Polk’s Brigade forward. Immediately, they opened fire on the unprotected flank, sending the Federals running back to their barricades. Not giving them time to entrench themselves, Cleburne ordered the batteries forward. Seeing that the horses could not bring the batteries within range due to the thick underbrush, Cleburne grabbed a battery, calling on volunteers to help him roll the cannons by hand into position. Unlimbering the batteries, the Confederate artillerists opened fire upon the barricades, spreading death and destruction into Thomas’ ranks. Leading the charge, Cleburne and his division leapt over the hated barricades and into the wavering Federal lines, taking hundreds of prisoners and three more guns. Captain Sam Foster of the Texas Brigade recalled the charge:

It seemed like our whole army had been ordered forward at the same minute, and then there was a noise and Yelling that made Ark. Post appear as childs play to it. Fighting is terrible business at best, but when it comes to fighting in the night—so dark you can’t see anything than it is awful—sublime. In half an hour the whole Yankee army seem to be in full run, and our army after them, helter skelter right over their works, and into their temporary camp. Dead, and wounded, and dying are thick here…Finally after a terrible slaughter we are halted and our lines reformed, a picket put out and we lie down and are asleep in a few minutes. (17)

Sources

1: Dear Irvie, Dear Lucy: page 125

: Ibid: page 123

: Ibid: page 124

2: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 6 page 116

: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 8 page 109-110

: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 6 page 116

3: A Meteor Shining Brightly: Chapter 5 page 99

: Dear Irvie, Dear Lucy: page 128

4: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 8 page 114

: Three Months in the Southern States by Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle

: Ibid

5: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 8 page 115

: Dear Irvie, Dear Lucy: page 142

6: One of Cleburne’s Command The Civil war Reminiscences and Diary of Capt. Samuel T. Foster,

Granbury’s Texas Brigade, CSA Edited by Norman D. Brown: Chapter 2 page 43

7: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 7 page 126

: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 8 page 116

: Ibid

: article of the Tullahoma Campaign found on http://brotherswar.org/liberty.htm

8: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 7 page 133

: Ibid

9: CHICKAMAUGA-THE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WEST: BY DANIEL H. HILL

10: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 9 page 131

11: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 9 page 132

12: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 8 page 144

13: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: chapter 9 page 133

: Ibid: page 132

: Ibid

: Ibid: page 133

14: Pat Cleburne Confederate General: notes page 307

15: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 8 page 147

16: Stonewall of the West: Chapter 8 page 150

17: One of Cleburne’s Command: chapter 2 page 54